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Abstract Evidence for nation-states suggests that the long-standing negative rela-
tionship between fertility and economic development might turn positive at high
levels of development. The robustness of the reversal continues to be debated. We
add to this discussion from a novel angle by considering whether such a reversal
could also occur at the sub-national level within highly developed countries. Our
contributions are both theoretical and empirical. We first discuss important trends
which might foster the emergence of a positive fertility–development relationship
across regions of highly developed countries. These include shifts in family policies,
changes in the spatial organisation of the economic sphere, and selective interna-
tional and internal migration processes. In order to explore whether we observe
tendencies towards a reversal, we investigate data covering 20 European countries
subdivided in 256 regions between 1990 and 2012. We document a weakening of
the negative relationship between fertility and economic development within many
countries, and among some countries the emergence of a positive relationship.
These findings do not seem to be driven by postponement effects alone. However,
there is substantial variation in the fertility and the economic development levels at
which such tendencies towards a reversal are observed.
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1 The Negative Association Between Fertility and Economic
Development—Is it Here to Stay?
Dominant demographic theories such as the demographic transition and second
demographic transition frameworks postulate a negative relationship between
development and fertility. As societies progress, fertility tends to decrease (Kirk
1996; Lesthaeghe 2010). Proposed potential mechanisms include the opportunity
costs of childbearing, investments in the quality instead of the quantity of children
(Becker 1960), or in the case of the second demographic transition, rising higher-
order needs conflicting with childbearing aspirations (Lesthaeghe 2010). These
frameworks fit the available evidence over most of the twentieth century, as areas
with advanced levels of economic development tended to have lower fertility levels
than less developed areas. Perhaps due to the implicit assumption of demographic
transition theory that fertility decline is not reversible (Burger and DeLong 2016),
attention has accordingly been directed towards the implications of this relationship,
particularly with regard to population age structures (e.g. Wigglesworth 2016;
Zeihan 2014). Recently however, new theoretical considerations have been
presented which suggest that at high levels of development the relationship
between development and fertility might turn positive (Esping-Andersen and Billari
2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). These new theories point to improvements in
gender equality as potential driver of rising fertility levels in highly developed
countries.
Concurrent with these theoretical shifts are shifts in the empirical evidence.
While a global national-level comparison still tends to demonstrate a negative
relationship between fertility and development levels, recent evidence suggests that
among high-income countries this relationship may transition from negative to
positive. Myrskyla¨ et al. (2009) found that at high levels of socioeconomic
development, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), the
relationship between development and fertility turns from negative to positive.
This observation has been referred to under different names in the literature,
including ‘‘the income/development-fertility reversal’’, ‘‘inverse J-shaped associa-
tion’’, or ‘‘convex relationship between income/development and fertility’’. These
terms are used synonymously throughout this paper. Luci-Greulich and The´venon
(2014) also determined a convex relationship between GDP per capita and fertility
among OECD countries. In line with the above-mentioned theoretical considera-
tions on shifts in gender relations, the authors attribute the new patterns in the
fertility–development association to the changing relationship between female
employment and fertility. Myrskyla¨ et al. (2011) also argue that a high level of
gender equality is critical for the association between development and fertility to
reverse.
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However, whether such a reversal is occurring remains contested. Ryabov (2015)
applied factor analyses with cross-sectional US county data to state that
development and fertility are negatively related in the USA. Harttgen and Vollmer
(2014) used a revised HDI index and its health, education, and standard of living
components to argue that the finding of a positive association between development
and fertility in Myrskyla¨ et al. (2009) is sensitive to the choice of the development
measure. A more general criticism accepts the presence of a ‘‘reversal’’ but
questions whether it is occurring due to increases in the quantum of fertility, or
whether it is simply a sign of the end of a period characterised by strong fertility
postponement. Period fertility rates can be depressed as a result of women
postponing their births to higher ages, and when fertility postponement slows down,
period fertility may increase (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012; Goldstein et al. 2009).
Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012), for instance, argue that recent rises in fertility in
highly developed countries are mostly driven by postponement effects. They
suggest that a reversal of the association between development and fertility is driven
primarily by further advances in economic development and the simultaneous
slowing or ending of fertility postponement. These two processes may simply
happen simultaneously without a causal relationship between the two. However,
analyses of cohort fertility trends suggest that at least a portion of the rising fertility
rates in highly developed countries is attributable to true increases in the quantum of
fertility (Myrskyla¨ et al. 2013; Schmertmann et al. 2014). Furthermore, even if
postponement effects are an important mechanism that links trends in economic
development to changes in fertility, the relationship between economic development
and fertility remains important.
The goals of this paper are to add the sub-national regional dimension to this
discussion both in terms of theoretical considerations and empirical findings, and to
explore to what extent changes in postponement contribute to the observed patterns
in European countries. Within European countries, sub-national regions vary in their
levels of income/development and fertility, which can be adequately captured with
cross-country comparative data. Relative to cross-country differences, regions
within countries tend to be generally more similar in their cultural and policy
frameworks (Basten et al. 2011; Decroly and Grasland 1993; Watkins 1991). As
such, exploiting variation in the sub-national dimension offers potential to improve
our understanding of the fertility–income relationship. Findings for nation-states
could be driven by national-level variation in economic structures and policies
simultaneously affecting both fertility and levels of income or development.
Through the addition of the sub-national level, these national-level trends can be
controlled for, as well as any regional-level differences that do not change over the
period of study or exhibit regional spatial autocorrelation.
In our theoretical section, we discuss recent developments that might attenuate or
reverse the long-standing negative fertility–income relationship across sub-national
regions in highly developed countries. To our knowledge, this paper represents the
first attempt to develop a theoretical argument why we might witness a turnaround
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in the fertility–income relationship across sub-national regions. In the subsequent
empirical analysis we explore whether we can detect tendencies towards a
turnaround of the fertility–income relationship across regions within countries. Our
analysis focuses on Europe, as previous work has shown that a number of highly
developed European countries appear to be susceptible to a reversal in the fertility–
income relationship (Luci-Greulich and The´venon 2014; Myrskyla¨ et al.
2009, 2011). Specifically, we use data for 20 European countries divided in 256
sub-national regions over the period 1990–2012.1 Our outcomes provide evidence
for attenuation and tendencies towards a reversal from negative to positive in the
relationship between income and fertility in a number of European countries. While
postponement effects do appear to contribute to the observed trends, the estimated
positive association at high levels of development is generally robust to attempts to
control for postponement. Furthermore, across countries there is substantial
variation in the fertility and economic development levels at which such tendencies
towards an attenuation or reversal are observed.
2 Development, Economic Centres and Peripheries, and Fertility—
Theoretical Background
2.1 The Emergence of the Negative Relationship
A vast literature has documented the negative relationship between income or
development and fertility (e.g. Becker 1960; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Goldstein
and Klu¨sener 2014; Guinnane 2011; Oppenheim Mason 1997). We will thus
primarily focus on aspects relevant for understanding variation within countries, as
this dimension has traditionally received less focus in research on the relationship
between income and fertility. As we find within many countries a positive
relationship between per capita income levels and the degree of urbanisation, we
will also cover considerations related to urban–rural and centre–periphery
disparities.2
Europe’s distant past has been arguably characterised by Malthusian cycles of
boom and bust in which increases in income generated increases in fertility
(Guinnane 2011). Over the course of the demographic transition during the
1 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).
2 Capital regions and centres of economic activity are commonly characterised by high degrees of
urbanisation. The only significant exception where highly urbanised areas might not be among the most
developed areas of a country is among regions that industrialised early and relied heavily on economic
sectors that have lost relevance over the last 50 years (e.g. coal mining and the steel industry). Examples
of such regions are the German Ruhr area, northeastern England, central Belgium, and Polish Upper
Silesia (see also Hospers 2004).
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this relationship began to break down, such that
higher levels of per capita income no longer translated into higher levels of fertility
(Dribe and Scalone 2014; Skirbekk 2008). This was the case for both urban and
rural areas (Klu¨sener et al. 2014). One explanation for why such a transition may
have occurred was offered by Becker (1960), who considered the ability of parents
to trade investments in the quantity of children for investments in quality (see also
Lawson and Mace 2011). The incentive to invest in quality over quantity can be
amplified by enhanced social mobility opportunities, which have mostly emerged in
centres of economic activity (Lipset and Bendix 1991). This likely increased the
propensity that shifts from quantity to quality occurred first in highly developed
areas, and this may have contributed to the negative association between economic
development and fertility across regions within European countries.
A related process during this period was the rise in the financial and opportunity
costs of having children. In high developed areas costs of living for families
increased faster than in less developed areas. In parallel, there were also substantial
changes in the spatial organisation of the economic sphere (Hayford 1974). Prior to
the industrial revolution, agricultural labourers usually lived close to their fields, and
proto-industrial forms of work such as weaving or craftsmanship often occurred in
the household. The shift of employment to factories and commercial zones
increased especially among employees in highly developed urban areas the
likeliness to be away from home for a substantial part of the day. Many of these new
employment opportunities also absorbed female workers, who had previously been
under-utilised in formal labour markets (Blythell 1993; Kocka 1990). Taking up
such employments limited the time available for childrearing tasks. Overall, these
financial and opportunity costs also fostered a negative relationship between
economic development and fertility levels at the sub-national level.
2.2 Why We Might Witness a Reversal of the Relationship
In discussing the potential role of shifts in family policies, we first look at past
patterns from which these shifts represent a deviation. Many European countries
faced strong fertility declines in the first half of the twentieth century, which led
governments to enact pro-family policies that mostly provided child benefits or tax
deductions and were targeted towards a male-breadwinner model (Gauthier 2002;
Lorimer 1945; PERFAR 2017). Apart from additional support given to families with
multiple children, these payments were usually not means-tested (PERFAR 2017;
see also Gauthier 2002). As these benefits were imperfectly adjusted for costs of
living, in real terms they were most beneficial for residents of less developed
regions within a country. Thus, if this first generation of family policies affected
fertility, it would likely have intensified the negative relationship between economic
development and fertility levels across regions within countries.
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In recent decades, the focus of family policy reforms has shifted to extending
parental leave schemes and childcare (Gauthier 2002; PERFAR 2017). Rather than
providing transfer payments, these new family policies are aimed at decreasing the
opportunity costs of childrearing (Gauthier 2007). Such costs are particularly high
when both partners have acquired substantial human capital and have high earning
potential. Parental leave support payments are often linked to prior income levels,
which better adjusts for individual and regional variation in cost of living. In
addition, because many parental leave programs guarantee that after taking a period
of leave a parent can return to his or her previous job, uncertainties regarding future
career options are reduced. The improved access to publicly supported childcare
decreases the time trade-off parents would face without such services, so mitigates
parental opportunity costs. Overall, relative to the first generation of family policies,
this second generation likely provides better support for dual-earner couples with
high incomes. Since these individuals are concentrated in highly developed areas
(de Meester and van Ham 2009), we believe these policies to weaken the negative
relationship between income and fertility, or even to contribute to a turnaround.
Changes in family policies also support recent changes in gender roles towards a
higher degree of gender egalitarianism (Neyer and Andersson 2008). Esping-
Andersen and Billari (2015) argue that fertility tends to decline when women enter
the labour market in large numbers, but that it begins to increase if a society
approaches gender egalitarianism. Family policies that support parents in recon-
ciling work and family can be a crucial element in this process. Since highly
educated women are more likely to see gender egalitarianism in their partnerships
than their less educated counterparts (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015), and since
these women are more concentrated in highly developed regions, this shift in gender
roles could also more positively affect fertility in these regions.
For this second wave of family policies, there is temporal variation across
European countries in the introduction of a family policy mix that supports parents
in reconciling family and career goals. Northern and Western European countries
were the forerunners in implementing such policies, while Central-Western,
Eastern, and Southern European countries lagged behind (Gauthier 2002; PERFAR
2017; The´venon 2011). Especially in Southern Europe, policies continue to be
fragmented and thus do less to mitigate the uncertainty over whether both partners
would be able to reconcile family and career goals after the birth of a(nother) child
(The´venon 2011). This variation might also help to explain why Northern and
Western European countries are more likely than Central-Western and Southern
European countries to have experienced a stabilisation of cohort fertility at rather
high fertility levels (Myrskyla¨ et al. 2013; for empirical support for a link between
family policies and fertility trends, see, e.g. Kalwij 2010 and Klu¨sener et al. 2013).
In addition to these shifts in family policies, another important process
influencing recent trends are changes in the spatial organisation of the economic
sphere. The Internet and associated technologies have opened up opportunities for
individuals to create more flexible working arrangements than previously possible.
Under such arrangements, employees are freed from the obligation to be present at a
regular workplace for all work hours (see also Gauthier 2007). Just as
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industrialisation changed the spatial organisation of economic activities in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, technological advancements are changing the
spatial organisation of economic activities in the twenty-first century. In this
process, residential households are regaining importance as places for generating
income. Flexible working arrangements offer new options for combining childrea-
ring obligations with career plans, and as such also support increased gender
equality. This could have positive effects on the fertility decisions of working
couples, as childbearing intentions are affected by the amount of subjective control
over his or her work a person is able to achieve (Begall and Mills 2011). Although
the share of employees able to make use of such flexible opportunities is still low in
many countries, these opportunities have increased in recent years, especially for the
highly educated (e.g. Beninger and Carter 2013). As long as centrality and
agglomeration effects will remain relevant in economic activities (Krugman 1998),
these highly educated will be concentrated in more economically advanced areas.
Thus, we believe that increases in flexible work arrangements offer potential to
contribute to an attenuation or reversal of the sub-national regional-level
relationship between income and fertility.
The final important trend related to the potential reversal between fertility and
income across sub-national regions is that of selective international and internal
migration and the ensuing developmental challenges in peripheral areas. With the
industrial revolution, the relevance of land as a production factor declined. This
development, together with innovations in agricultural production that decreased the
demand for rural labour, contributed to substantial migration streams from
peripheral to more centralised areas. As a general trend, this phenomenon continues
today. Migration is usually selective in terms of individual assets, such as health
status and the resources to migrate (Abramitzky et al. 2012; Blau and Mackie 2017;
Mehta and Elo 2012). As such, this long period of outflow from less developed
regions might create development challenges in these areas, with negative effects on
available human capital, partner markets, and fertility levels.
Effects of migration on fertility patterns can be observed not only within
countries, but also between countries. Like domestic migrants, international
migrants frequently tend to settle in highly developed areas, as these are usually
the places with more opportunities and social and communication links to countries
abroad (Bonifazi et al. 2008). The inflow of international migrants into highly
developed areas can have significant positive effects on fertility levels, particularly
in low-fertility contexts (Billari and Dalla-Zuanna 2011). This can be both due to
quantum and tempo effects, as many foreign migrants postpone fertility until they
reach their destination (Wilson 2013). Overall, processes of selective international
and internal migration might be of particular relevance for countries with low
fertility levels. If these migration processes contribute to a positive association
between economic development and fertility, they may do so at fertility levels far
below the replacement level.
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2.3 The ‘‘Noise’’ of Mid-Term Transitions Within Long-Term Transitions
The broad trends outlined above are long-term transitions that operate over decades
or even centuries. In addition to these long-term developments, there are also
transitions that operate at shorter time intervals. These mid-term transitions might
cause temporary shifts in the fertility–development relationship at the sub-national
level, challenging efforts to monitor long-term shifts in this relationship. Two
shorter-term transitions discussed here are the postponement of births to higher ages
and the transition processes in Eastern Europe following the collapse of
communism.
As mentioned above, one interpretation of the empirical evidence pointing to a
turnaround in the relationship between period fertility rates and income is the end of
postponement (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012). The reversal in the association
between development and fertility from negative to positive can at least in part be
linked to a temporary depression of fertility levels due to the postponement of
births, and the following recovery when postponement ends. If highly developed
regions within countries experience postponement earlier or to a greater degree, this
might create temporary distortions in the association between development and
fertility at the sub-national level. However, postponement effects on fertility should
not be interpreted as resulting from demographic pressures alone. Social and
economic forces start the process of fertility postponement, and it is likely that these
forces play an important role in determining how long postponement continues. In
addition, recent empirical evidence of stabilising or even increasing cohort fertility
rates in a number of European countries (Myrskyla¨ and Goldstein 2013; Myrskyla¨
et al. 2013; Schmertmann et al. 2014) suggests that also upward trends in the
quantum of fertility might play a role.
The post-communist transition crisis that many Eastern Europeans experienced
during the 1990s is another shorter-term transition that may affect our ability to
study long-term shifts in the sub-national level relationship between fertility and
economic development. The economic crises of differing levels across these
countries had consequences for both postponement decisions and quantum fertility
levels (Myrskyla¨ et al. 2013; Sobotka 2003). Exploratory analyses of our data
suggest that regions with varying income levels were not substantially different in
their initial fertility reaction to the crisis, but that high developed areas seemed to
have generally recovered more quickly (see also Alam et al. 2005 and Macours and
Swinnen 2008). These uneven recoveries from the transition shock might appear as
the emergence of a positive relationship, even though they are likely ‘‘noise’’ of a
distortion due to the post-communist crisis.
As fertility postponement and the post-communist transition are highly relevant
for our study period (1990–2012), it is important to consider these aspects in our
analyses of changes in the fertility–income relationship. To explore how postpone-
ment affects our analysis, we compare models using the total fertility rate (TFR) as a
fertility measure with models in which the TFR is replaced by a tempo-adjusted
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TFR. To account for the potential distortion effects due to the post-communist
transition, we separate the sample between Western European countries and the
former communist Eastern European countries. As a final comment, the 2007
economic recession may also represent a short-term distortion. We explore this
further in the online appendix of consistency checks.
3 Data
In this section, we briefly outline the data and variables used. For a detailed
discussion of the data, including summary statistics and our decisions on
corrections, we refer readers to the ‘‘Data Appendix’’. Our analysis relies on
fertility and economic data at the NUTS 2 level, where NUTS is a hierarchical
classification system of the European Union (EU) that distinguishes countries and
sub-national regions of comparable population size across Europe. We analyse
NUTS 2 level data as this is the lowest level of division for which the required
fertility and economic data are available. NUTS 2 regions generally have
populations between about 800,000 and three million inhabitants. To explore
whether the association between income and fertility turns from negative to positive
at high levels of development we require two variables (per capita income and per
capita income squared) that reflect the variation within countries; thus, at least three
different regions are needed to make an estimate. To ensure at least one degree of
freedom, we omit all EU/EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries with
less than four regions from the analysis. Switzerland is also excluded due to data
limitations (for additional details see ‘‘Data Appendix’’).
To calculate the TFR and an estimate of a tempo-adjusted TFR, age-specific birth
count and population data were drawn from a combination of sources. Most of the
data were obtained through Eurostat. However, there are some large gaps in the time
series for a number of countries during the period of observation. We thus made
substantial efforts to fill in these gaps using data directly derived from national
statistical offices. This also allowed us to correct some inconsistencies in the Eurostat
data (see ‘‘Data Appendix’’). For some countries, it was unfortunately not possible to
obtain a complete time series of sub-national fertility rates since 1990. We face some
variation in the quality of the fertility data, which is mostly driven by challenges
statistical offices faced in accounting for changes in the population due to under-
registered migration during intercensal periods. This aspect is especially important
for Eastern European countries which witnessed significant outmigration in the early
1990s and after the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement rounds. Most of the population
data used in our analyses has been retrospectively adjusted by the statistical offices
based on the outcomes of the 2001 and 2011 census rounds. Nevertheless, we
encourage caution when interpreting the Eastern European results. This is
particularly true for models which include the not-backward-adjusted Romanian
data between the censuses of 2002 and 2011 (see below and ‘‘Data Appendix’’).
Economic data were obtained from Cambridge Econometrics (CE). These data
primarily originate from Eurostat and were adjusted by CE to 2005 Euros using
purchasing power parity deflators. Employee compensation per capita is chosen as
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our measure of per capita income, as it accounts for household income levels better
than the more commonly used Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP, which is
calculated in the dataset as Total Gross Value Added, plus taxes and less subsidies,
captures total income generated by both firms and households. This provides a good
measure to compare the overall economic development of different areas. However,
as we are interested in variation in private household incomes across regions, it is
potentially a challenge that GDP comprises both labour and capital income. Capital
owners may be less likely to reside in the same region relative to labourers, so
information on capital income may be less relevant for fertility decisions in the
region. For that reason we focus on the aforementioned employee compensation,
which consists of wages and salaries, and of employers’ social contributions. This
measure of income should more closely approximate the labour income earned by
individuals in the different regions. Employment participation rates and the
demographic structure of the population can vary across our regions. We focus,
however, on employee compensation per capita instead of compensation per worker
or per ‘‘active population’’ member (which includes both employed and unem-
ployed people, but not economically inactive, such as (pre-)school children,
students, and pensioners) to gauge the experienced economic well-being of the
population.3
We acknowledge that employee compensation per capita may miss income
generated by households in other ways. If regions differ significantly in how that
income is generated, employee compensation may reflect a distorted measure of
actual household income levels. Sub-national regions might, for example, vary in
the amount of remittances received. In this case, employee compensation per capita
will overestimate household incomes in sending regions and underestimate
household incomes in receiving regions. If remittances are important for the
relationship, then using GDP per capita as a measure of economic development that
includes received remittances spent locally should result in significantly different
model estimates. That we do not observe substantial differences between models
using GDP per capita and employee compensation per capita indicates that these
distortions do not likely represent a significant source of bias.
4 Empirical Analyses
4.1 Cross-Sectional Comparisons
As a first step of analysis, we look at trends in the cross-sectional relationship
between income and fertility levels across NUTS 2 regions for each of the sample
countries between 1990 and 2012. We do this by performing cross-sectional
regressions on a by-country annual basis. Thus, for each year and for each country,
TFRs are regressed on the lag of adjusted employee compensation per capita.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the country-specific cross-sectional correlations for countries in
3 Results from the analyses below were not sensitive to adjusting income per capita to income per worker
or income per active population.
J. Fox et al.
123
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−1
.0
−0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Year
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
n 
La
gg
ed
 E
m
pl
oy
ee
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
pe
r C
ap
ita
France
Norway
Belgium
Sweden
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
Denmark
Finland
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−1
.0
−0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Year
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
n 
La
gg
ed
 E
m
pl
oy
ee
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
pe
r C
ap
ita
Portugal
Italy
Austria
Spain
Greece
Germany, West
Germany
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Predicted changes in total fertility rates from a 1% change in income: Western European
countries, 1990–2012. a North and West, b Centre and South. Predicted fertility changes are calculated
annually from cross-sectional country-specific regressions. Each data point then represents the coefficient
of the lagged natural log of employee compensation per capita regressed on the TFR annually across
regions for each of the different countries. Employee compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in
cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the latter. It consists of
wages and salaries, and of employers’ social contributions and is adjusted to 2005 Euros. Source:
Eurostat, Statistical Offices, Cambridge Econometrics; own calculations
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Western Europe (Fig. 1) and Eastern Europe (Fig. 2). For readability, Fig. 1 is
further subdivided into those Western European countries situated in the north and
west of Europe (Fig. 1a) and those situated in the centre and the south (Fig. 1b).
From Fig. 1a, we see that in the early 1990s the relationship was negative for
almost all displayed Western European countries in the north and west. The only
exceptions were France and Belgium. For Finland, the cross-sectional correlation
remained consistently negative throughout the study period, and became slightly
more negative in the most recent years. However, apart from Finland, we only
observe for France and the UK a more negative correlation coefficient in 2012 than
in the early 1990s. Among the five countries that experienced increases, Norway
and Sweden stand out. Both countries moved from having a relatively negative
correlation to a positive one. However, for Sweden, the correlation declined in the
last 2 years of the period to a value just below zero. Additionally, although the
correlation has remained negative for both Denmark and the Netherlands, these two
countries have recently been experiencing movement towards reporting a less
negative relationship between per capita income and fertility.
If we turn to the Western European countries in the centre and the south of
Europe (Fig. 1b), one trend that stands out is the big change in the fertility–income
relationship for Germany from high positive to negative values. The high positive
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Fig. 2 Predicted changes in total fertility rates from a 1% change in income: Eastern European countries,
1990–2012. Predicted fertility changes are calculated annually from cross-sectional country-specific
regressions. Each data point then represents the coefficient of the lagged natural log of employee
compensation per capita regressed on the TFR annually across regions for each of the different countries.
Employee compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer
to an employee in return for work done by the latter. It consists of wages and salaries, and of employers’
social contributions and is adjusted to 2005 Euros. ‘‘Germany, East’’ includes former West Berlin as part
of the city of Berlin. Source: Eurostat, Statistical Offices, Cambridge Econometrics; own calculations
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values in the early 1990s were related to the depression in fertility in the eastern
German regions as a result of the post-communist transition. At that time, the more
affluent regions in western Germany also had relatively low fertility levels, but these
were still higher than those of eastern Germany. Eastern Germany still lags behind
western Germany in terms of economic development, but fertility has generally
recovered and is currently higher than in western Germany (Goldstein and
Kreyenfeld 2011). As a result, the coefficient for Germany turned negative in the
2000s. Because the effects of the previous division of Germany may linger, we
derive the coefficients for the western and the eastern German areas separately. The
trend for western Germany is included in Fig. 1b, while the trend for eastern
Germany is grouped with those of the other former communist countries in Fig. 2.
As visible in Fig. 1b, nearly all of the countries had a negative correlation
coefficient in the early 1990s, with Austria and Portugal being the exceptions. Apart
from (united) Germany with its explainable concave trend, all of the displayed
countries show a tendency towards an increasing coefficient. As a result, we
estimate a (slightly) negative association between income and fertility at the end of
the study period for western Germany and Greece only, while Italy and Spain have
joined Austria and Portugal in reporting non-negative coefficients.
Figure 2 presents the trends for Eastern Europe. As the countries in Fig. 1b, the
Eastern European countries also display a generally consistent pattern. Only eastern
Germany had a positive coefficient at the beginning of the study period, which is
likely an artefact of the data. Approximately, two-thirds of the population of Berlin
are living in former West Berlin, which had been part of West Germany during the
division of the country. As a result, Berlin was less affected by the drastic post-
communist transition crisis eastern Germany experienced in the early 1990s. Thus,
despite having relatively low fertility levels, Berlin was the region of eastern
Germany that had the highest economic development and fertility levels in the
1990s. This pattern changed as the crises passed, with the fertility levels of many
eastern German regions overtaking those of Berlin. If Berlin is omitted from eastern
Germany, we also obtain a negative coefficient at the beginning of the study period.
The negative relationship observed in all Eastern European countries in the early
1990s weakened throughout the 1990s and 2000s, so that we witness for most of these
countries fertility–income correlations of around zero in 2012. Only Romania
experienced something of a reversion in the final years of our study period. However,
this seems to be an artefact of the shortcomings in the Romanian population estimates
for the 2000s that created a downward bias in fertility rates in less developed regions
and an upward bias in the more developed ones (see ‘‘Data Appendix’’ for more
details). This bias might have substantially contributed to the observed ‘‘reduction’’ in
the negative coefficient in the 2000s, as the coefficients for the years following the
2002 and 2011 census years are not far apart. While other Eastern European countries
also face challenges with their population exposures, it is to some degree reassuring
that we do not observe breaks in the time trends of the cross-sectional coefficients for
any other country in Figs. 1 and 2 around the different census years (for country-
specific census years, see the ‘‘DataAppendix’’). As to the potential impact of the 2007
crisis, we note that we do not witness massive changes in the trends of our cross-
sectional coefficients during the recession period (see Figs. 1 and 2).
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Overall, the trends of these cross-sectional associations provide support that over
the last two decades most European countries have experienced a lessening of the
negative association between economic development and fertility across their
regions. In many countries, this association has even turned positive. However, the
fertility and economic levels at which countries report such tendencies vary
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substantially across countries. To illustrate this, we show in Fig. 3 the trajectories of
sub-national regions by fertility and income for a selected number of countries. In
Italy (Panel a), Poland (Panel b), and Austria (Panel c), the tendencies towards an
attenuation or reversal occur at a TFR of around 1.3. In Belgium (Panel d), on the
other hand, we can witness this shift at a higher TFR level of 1.7. Furthermore, the
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employee compensation levels at which this trend pattern is observed vary
substantially across countries (from 2000 Euros in Poland to more than 10,000
Euros in Austria and Belgium).
Figure 3 also allows a look into the trends during the last years of the observation
period, when many countries were affected by the 2007 recession. As the trends
evolve over time, the lines are plotted in more saturated colours allowing the
identification of the final years in the panel (2008–2012), when many countries were
affected by the recession. In Italy especially, many regions exhibited a backwards
bend in their income trends during the recession. This was usually paralleled by
downward shifts in fertility, indicating a positive association between fertility and
income during the crisis period.
4.2 Country-By-Year Fixed Effects
The preceding analysis looked at the evolution of the cross-sectional associations
between incomeand fertility levels over timewithin differentEuropeancountries. In this
secondpart of our empirical section,we investigate howchanges in incomeare related to
changes in fertility by applying country-by-year fixed effects models. We emphasise
these models are not specified to identify causal effects of income on fertility, but to
provide a broad perspective on the association between these two variables across
European regions. With that goal in mind, the models below include the TFR or the
tempo-adjusted TFR as dependent variable, and as explanatory variables, the prior year
log of regional income and its square (as measured by employee compensation per
capita). The square term is included to test for the convexity of the fertility–income
relationship. For unobserved factors affecting income and fertility jointly (e.g. family
policies and cultural norms), we attempt to control for with the fixed effects.
The country-by-year fixed effects model is based on the assumption that regions
within a country are identical in those factors related to both income and fertility.
We justify this assumption with the observation that, for Europe, the national level
is most relevant for aspects that might affect the general levels of income and
fertility in a country (Basten et al. 2011; Decroly and Grasland 1993; Watkins
1991). This includes standardised education curricula, national mass media,
migration policies, and policies affecting economic growth, work-family reconcil-
iation, and gender equality. We acknowledge that we might also face unobserved
heterogeneity at the sub-national level, especially in countries that are highly
federalised (see, for instance, Baizan 2009 on Spain). As such, our online appendix
includes consistency checks with regional fixed effects models (controlling for time-
invariant unobserved effects at the NUTS 2 regional level) and spatial panel models
that control for spatial autocorrelation in the error term among neighbouring
regions. Section 4.4 below summarises the findings from these and other
consistency checks presented in the online appendix.
In notation form, our main model is specified as follows:
yi;c;t ¼ vc  kt þ b1 ln inci;c;t1
 þ b2 ln inci;c;t1
 2þei;c;t ð1Þ
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with yi,c,t denoting the outcome variable (TFR, tempo-adjusted TFR) at time
t (measured in years), in country c, and in region i. The first term, vc * kt, controls
for the country-by-year fixed effects. The inclusion of this interaction term accounts
for a country-specific effect that varies over time. This is in contrast to the inclusion
of country and year fixed effects, which would control for the time-constant
country-level factors and the time-varying factors common to all of the countries in
the panel. Income per capita is represented by inc and appears in both the linear and
the squared terms. The error term ei,c,t is assumed with conditional mean zero. We
estimate this model separately for the full sample, for regions part of Western
European countries (including former West Germany), and for regions part of the
Eastern European countries (including former East Germany).4 Germany is divided
into its former East and West German regions since combining them, as seen in
Fig. 1a, likely violates the assumption of NUTS 2 level similarity within the
country-by-year fixed effects models.
Estimates from the model using TFR are presented in Table 1, as is the
associated level of per capita income at which the results indicate any sort of a
fertility reversal. There is a great deal of statistical uncertainty regarding the
specific income level at which a reversal might occur. So we interpret this
inversion point simply as a measure of the magnitude of the coefficients, not as the
specific income level at which the association between income and fertility is
expected to turn positive. The model results for the TFR indicate in point estimate
form what was visually apparent in Figs. 1 and 2. Estimates from the full sample
Table 1 Country-by-year fixed effects, total fertility rate (TFR). Source: Eurostat, Statistical Offices,
Cambridge Econometrics; own calculations
Independent variables Europe
(combined sample)
Western Europe Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3)
Prior year compensation per capita
(natural log)
- 1.255 (0.089)** - 0.884 (0.224)** - 2.271 (0.184)**
Prior year compensation per capita
squared (natural log)
0.064 (0.005)** 0.044 (0.012)** 0.129 (0.011)**
Constant 7.675 (0.403)** 5.957 (1.047)** 11.230 (0.745)**
Inversion point (in 2005 Euros) 18,827 € 23,656 € 6680 €
Country-year interacted fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5703 4522 1181
Regions 256 200 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.825 0.804 0.835
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Employee compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer
to an employee in return for work done by the latter. It consists of wages and salaries, and of employers’
social contributions and is adjusted to 2005 Euros. Inversion points are calculated using coefficients
rounded to the 8th decimal point
**p\ 0.01, *p\ 0.05, ?p\ 0.1
4 The division inWestern and Eastern European countries is analogous to the one applied for Figs. 1 and 2.
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presented in column 1 indicate a negative association between per capita income
and fertility at low levels of per capita income. This diminishes as per capita
income increases, and the models that we specified show a positive association at
about 19,000 2005 Euros for the combined European sample. Compensation per
capita is generally about 40–60% of GDP per capita for the set of regions in the
sample. Taking this into account, our outcomes are consistent with the findings
that Luci-Greulich and The´venon (2014) derived based on GDP data. When we
compare the Western and the Eastern European countries, the outcomes are
generally the same, but the estimates of the inversion point differ. For the Eastern
European countries, it occurs at an employee compensation per capita of about
7000 2005 Euros, while for the Western European countries the inversion point is
estimated at 24,000 2005 Euros.
4.3 Controlling for Tempo Effects in Fertility Trends Across Regions
To examine the extent to which fertility postponement may be contributing to the
above results, we attempt to control for tempo effects within the different
countries. The arguably most sophisticated approach suggested in the literature
requires parity-specific fertility by age for the different regions (Bongaarts and
Sobotka 2012). As these data are not available, we turn to a second-best method
by estimating the tempo-adjusted TFR using the information on the average age at
childbearing. This method has been described and evaluated by Potancˇokova´ et al.
(2008).5
According to Potancˇokova´ et al. (2008), the quality of the less sophisticated
estimate is high only if the fertility quantum is relatively low, there are no dramatic
changes in higher-order fertility, and when the changes in the mean age at childbirth
(MACB) are uniform and sufficiently small.6 During our study period, higher-order
births were not a primary component of the changes in fertility across our European
countries. However, in the mean age at childbirth, we observe in some regions in the
early stages of postponement changes that exceeded themaximum suggested figure of
about 0.1 years per year (Potancˇokova´ et al. 2008). This can cause an overestimation of
the tempo effect and too high estimates of the tempo-adjusted TFR. Such error in
measurement should decrease the likelihood of observing an upturn in the tempo-
adjustedTFR in later stages of the postponement transition. Since temporal variance in
annual changes introduces a significant amount of noise in the estimates, a smoothed
tempo-adjusted TFR (dTFR) is used as the dependent variable in Eq. (1).7
Comparing the model estimates for the tempo-adjusted TFR in Table 2 with
those in Table 1, the results appear generally the same. One difference between
Tables 1 and 2 is visible in the coefficients for Eastern Europe. Although they are
still highly statistically significant, the magnitude of both the linear and the squared
term coefficients have been reduced by about 20–25%, which implies that the
5 Specifically, we estimate the Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) tempo-adjusted TFR by calculating
dTFR = TFR/(1 - DMACB), where DMACB is the annual change in the mean age at childbearing.
6 According to Potancˇokova´ et al. (2008), ‘‘relatively low’’ fertility is a TFR below 2.0.
7 The mean age at childbearing is smoothed using a three-year moving average of t - 1, t, and t ? 1.
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increase in fertility that is associated with growing income is smaller when tempo
effects are controlled for. Meanwhile, for Western Europe, we can see that
accounting for changes in tempo using the mean age at childbirth results in a more
convex association between income and fertility.
4.4 Robustness Checks
We implemented a number of robustness checks, which are discussed and presented
in the online appendix. Here, we summarise briefly their results. Our robustness
checks consisted of including regional fixed effects, using GDP per capita instead of
employee compensation per capita, running separate models for the period before
and after the onset of the 2007 recession, interacting income with regional indicators
for regions in German-speaking and Southern European countries, and exploring
whether spatial autocorrelation unaccounted for by our main models may bias the
derived estimates (see also Belotti et al. 2016; Vitali and Billari 2017). The spatial
models required a balanced panel, so that we reduced the observation period and
excluded two countries with shorter time series (Romania and the Slovak Republic).
In our consistency checks for Western Europe, significance levels for our income
variables were in some instances reduced. This includes, for example, the models
with additional regional fixed effects and the GDP model with TFR as dependent
variable. The results nevertheless remain generally robust across both fertility
Table 2 Country-by-year fixed effects, tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR). Source: Eurostat,
Statistical Offices, Cambridge Econometrics; own calculations
Independent variables Europe
(combined
sample)
Western
Europe
Eastern
Europe
(1) (2) (3)
Prior year compensation per capita
(natural log)
- 1.120 (0.097)** - 2.089 (0.262)** - 1.754 (0.222)**
Prior year compensation per capita
squared (natural log)
0.059 (0.005)** 0.109 (0.014)** 0.102 (0.014)**
Constant 7.131 (0.451)** 11.755 (1.235)** 8.875 (0.885)**
Inversion point (in 2005 Euros) 13,075 € 14,289 € 5324 €
Country-year interacted fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5205 4116 1089
Regions 256 200 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.769 0.762 0.764
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Employee compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer
to an employee in return for work done by the latter. It consists of wages and salaries, and of employers’
social contributions and is adjusted to 2005 Euros. Tempo-adjusted TFR is the adjusted total fertility rate,
which is equal to TFR/(1 - DMACB), where DMACB is the annual change in the mean age at child-
bearing. Inversion points are calculated using coefficients rounded to the 8th decimal point
**p\ 0.01, *p\ 0.05, ?p\ 0.1
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measures.8 When using GDP per capita, the estimated relationship was slightly less
convex, but still statistically significant and with an estimated inversion point
around 67,000 Euros per capita. The results for Eastern Europe are also quite robust.
In contrast to Western Europe, however, we obtained in the tempo-adjusted models
with additional regional fixed effects as well as in those models controlling for
spatial autocorrelation reduced significance levels for our income covariates. For the
tempo-adjusted model controlling for spatial autocorrelation, we even got non-
statistically significant estimates for our income variables. However, in this model,
the coefficient for the spatially clustered error term was also not significant. Thus,
there is no indication to be concerned that the significant estimates for our income
variables in our main model on the tempo-adjusted TFR without controls for spatial
autocorrelation might be substantially biased due to unaccounted spatial autocor-
relation. In our consistency checks with the balanced panel that excluded Romania,
we show that the potential measurement bias in the Romanian data is not driving the
outcomes of our main models which include Romania. But we remain cautious in
interpreting the outcomes for Eastern Europe as support for the emergence of a
convex relationship.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Recently proposed theoretical considerations (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015;
Goldscheider et al. 2015) and national-level empirical evidence (Myrskyla¨ et al.
2009; Luci-Greulich and The´venon 2014) suggest that at high levels of development
the association between development and fertility might turn from negative to
positive. However, the robustness and interpretation of these findings continue to be
debated. In this paper, we sought to add the sub-national regional dimension to the
discussion of a potential reversal in the relationship between income and fertility at
high levels of development. The sub-national dimension helps to clarify the
potential mechanisms through which development could be related to fertility, as it
permits to control for national-level idiosyncrasies while also allowing for large
variation in income.
The theoretical contribution of our paper is to point out a number of recent and
current processes that could foster a weakening or a reversal of the long-standing
negative relationship between economic development and fertility levels across sub-
national regions in highly developed countries. These processes include in the area
of family policies the replacement of more direct transfer payments with a new
generation of policies that support the reconciliation of family and career goals; the
growth in location-flexible working arrangements that decrease the opportunity
costs of having children; and selective international and domestic migration patterns
8 One exceptional outcome was the prediction of a concave relationship in the models for Western
Europe in the period after the onset of the 2007 recession. However, although of different signs, plotting
the trajectories implied by the coefficients on income when using tempo-adjusted fertility yields relatively
similar trends between the two contrasted periods over the observed range of incomes per capita. All that
said, the models for the recession years are likely underpowered with insufficient sample sizes, and more
importantly, the results using the pre-2007 period are robust.
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that may affect fertility directly in highly developed areas through the population
composition and indirectly through effects on partner markets within outmigration
areas. Our theoretical considerations for how these trends could shape associations
between income and fertility are important for forming expectations on future
regional fertility variation within highly developed countries.
Analysing data from 20 European countries between 1990 and 2012, we explored
empirically for indications of an attenuation or turnaround of the long-standing
negative relationship between fertility and economic development across sub-
national regions. For most countries surveyed, we detected tendencies in this
direction. However, the specific fertility and economic development levels at which
tendencies towards a change in the relationship between fertility and economic
development are observed vary substantially across countries. Our longitudinal
regression analyses provided evidence for a convex association between income and
fertility in Western and Eastern Europe. These findings seem particularly robust in
Western Europe, which fits with our expectation that the emergence of such a
relationship happens first in the most developed European countries. The estimated
income level at which the association between income and fertility changes from
negative to positive was much lower in the east than in the west, but varied in both
regions depending on the model specification. Thus, similarly as Harttgen and
Vollmer (2014), we cannot draw conclusions about any specific turning point.
Furthermore, in many countries, the evidence is too weak to determine whether the
association between income and fertility is transforming to strictly positive, or
simply to one that is ‘‘not negative’’, where income is less related to fertility
differences across areas. We emphasise this qualification particularly for Eastern
Europe, where only Poland and the Slovak Republic seem to have made the
transition to a positive fertility–income relationship.
An important contributor to the fall and rise of fertility in European countries in
the period we have analysed is fertility postponement, which first suppressed period
fertility measures, before it boosted them as postponement slowed. It is disputed to
what extent this pattern might explain the national-level inverse J-shaped
association between fertility and development. Restrictions in data availability
only allowed us to control for postponement by using information on mean age at
childbirth, while we lacked data by parity. This may distort the results, as the
changes in the timing of first births can differ from those observed for all births or
for higher-order births. Prior research has suggested that the fertility rebound in
Eastern Europe is largely driven by postponement (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2009). The
outcomes of our admittedly crude attempt to control for postponement in Eastern
Europe are in line with these findings as the convex fertility–income association gets
weaker. However, both coefficients remain significant in the expected direction. In
Western Europe, on the other hand, our attempt to control for postponement does
not weaken the support for the existence of a convex relationship. We thus consider
it unlikely that using a parity-specific control for postponement would significantly
change the pattern identified for Western Europe. However, we remain nevertheless
cautious with claims that postponement has no additional effect beyond what was
identified above, as sub-national data are, for example, more affected by selective
migration between regions and from abroad during the reproductive period of the
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life course. In addition, we also remain cautious about overemphasising the results
for Eastern Europe. The observed ‘‘reversal’’ for Eastern European countries could
be a function of unmeasured postponement effects in these areas, spatially uneven
recovery from the post-communist recession, or issues in the measurements of
regional fertility rates. We hope for future research to improve our understanding
how aspects such as selective migration patterns might affect attempts to control for
postponement at the sub-national regional level.
Our chosen empirical approach is well suited to study shifts in the fertility–
income relationship at the sub-national regional level for a large number of
European countries. However, data constraints did not allow us to explicitly test at a
pan-European scale whether the observed shifts in the fertility–income association
are indeed related to the processes outlined in our theoretical considerations. In
order to study this in detail, we believe it is best to focus on countries for which
register or register-like data are available. Such data allow for analyses with large
samples of individual-level data at high geographic detail that include controls at the
individual or contextual local level for aspects considered in our theoretical
considerations (e.g. child care, flexible working arrangements, migration patterns,
etc.). A recent example of such an approach is Wood et al. (2017). The patterns
observed in our study are nevertheless consistent with our theoretical considera-
tions. Among the Western European countries that currently have a positive or only
slightly negative relationship, and that experienced the turnaround at relatively high
fertility levels, are France, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway. These countries were
among the forerunners in the introduction of family policies aimed at supporting
parents in reconciling their family and career goals (Gauthier 2002; PERFAR 2017).
Another pattern consistent with our considerations is that in Austria a positive
relationship existed throughout the period, but at very low fertility levels. Existing
research has attributed this distinctive pattern to selective international migration to
the most developed region of Vienna (Zeman et al. 2010).
One additional restriction is that we only have access to income data which was
measured at the place of work, while a measurement at the place of residence would
be preferable. This might create biases when big cities or metropolitan areas
constitute their own regions into which people commute into for work. However,
this data limitation would bias against the identification of a convex relationship
shown in Tables 1 and 2, as high incomes generated in the most developed regions
would be used for realising fertility intentions in less developed neighbouring
regions. For future research, it might also be promising to perform a similar study on
male fertility, as many less developed peripheral areas have male-dominated sex
ratios among the inhabitants of childbearing age. Thus, the observed tendencies
towards an attenuation or reversal of the association might even be stronger if male
fertility was considered.
Overall, our paper provides theoretical support for the view that a turnaround in
the relationship between fertility and economic development might occur as well at
the sub-national level in highly developed countries. Our empirical analysis
indicates that such tendencies are already visible, particularly in Western Europe.
However, it is too early to draw definite conclusions whether we are indeed
witnessing a turnaround to a genuine positive relationship between income and
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fertility, or simply the emergence of a less or non-negative relationship. As sub-
national parity-specific register or register-like data become increasingly available
across Europe, future research might be able to investigate shifts in the sub-national
fertility–income association with more detailed data in the years to come.
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Data Appendix
In selecting our sample of sub-national regions, we relied on the NUTS
classification system of the European Union that distinguishes countries and sub-
national regions of comparable population size across Europe. NUTS 1 generally
represents regional divisions with populations between three and seven million
persons, NUTS 2 regional divisions with populations between about 800,000 and
three million persons, and NUTS 3 areas with populations between about 150,000
and 800,000 persons. We utilise NUTS 2 level data, as this is the lowest level of
division for which the required fertility and economic data are available. Two
limitations of the NUTS classification are that the regions do not necessarily reflect
long-standing administrative divisions within countries, and that the population
sizes of regions are not always within the proposed ranges. But it is a widely used
and generally consistent geographic classification system.
In our analyses on the association between income and fertility, we require the
two variables of per capita income and per capita income squared. Since we use a
fixed effects approach, for any given country at least three different regions are
needed for an estimate. To ensure at least one degree of freedom, we therefore
exclude the following EU/EFTA countries with less than four regions from the
analysis: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia. In addition, Switzerland is excluded due to a
lack of income data. The analysed Western European countries/areas are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, former West Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. In Eastern Europe, we
cover Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, former East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and the Slovak Republic.
In addition to the above countries, we also exclude a handful of unusual NUTS 2
regions. We omit these regions because they are either geographically isolated and/
Is a Positive Relationship Between Fertility and Economic…
123
or culturally deviating from the countries’ mainland. These are the Swedish-
speaking A˚land Islands in Finland, the Canary Islands and the North African
exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Spain, and the Azores and Madeira in Portugal. For
Germany, we exclude the region of Berlin from the panel data models, as the data
do not allow distinguishing former East from West Berlin.
The demographic data on the births by five-year age groups and the female
populations by five-year age groups have mainly been obtained from the Eurostat
web database (final datasets were last updated as of April 14, 2015 (population data)
and April 29, 2015 (birth data)). In addition, we used data from national statistical
offices to fill large time series gaps for a number of countries during the period of
observation. Data from the national statistical offices also allowed us to correct
inconsistencies in the Eurostat data. For example, we noticed an anomaly in the
Finnish birth data available from Eurostat, which in 1996 use a maternal age
seemingly derived differently than the rest of the series. This anomaly disappeared,
when we replaced the Eurostat data with data available in the StatFin database of
Statistics Finland. Table 3 contains information on temporal coverage and on the
alternative sources from which we obtained data to complement and correct data
that are available through Eurostat. It also provides details on slight inconsistencies
in the data for a small number of regions.
While the registration of births is quite reliable across European countries, the
quality of population data used to calculate the fertility rates might vary across our
dataset of 256 regions. During our observation period, most countries were still
relying on a classical approach to derive population statistics with censuses and
intercensal population estimates based on registered vital and migration events. A
major source of error in the production of intercensal population estimates is the
under-registration of migration events, which can lead to bias in the population data
that might be particularly high at the end of the intercensal period. The registration
of migration events is particularly problematic when migrants move abroad
(Raymer et al. 2011). If they do not register their departure, it can take years to
detect their absence. During our observation period, the Eastern European countries
in particular experienced substantial outmigration. High rates occurred immediately
after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s, and after the 2004 and 2007 EU
enlargement rounds (Eurostat). In addition, Southern European countries faced non-
negligible outmigration after the onset of the 2007 recession, which was likely in
part not registered.
Fortunately, population data for most of these countries have been retrospectively
adjusted by the statistical offices based on the outcomes of the 2001 and 2011
census rounds. For the last census round this was true for Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, and the UK. Other
countries implemented backward adjustments for some years (e.g. Austria for
2008–2011; and Poland for 2010–2011). Among the Eastern and Southern European
countries, only Hungary, Poland for the period 2001–2009, and Romania lack
backward-adjusted population numbers. Another potentially problematic country is
Germany that had a long intercensal period between the East German census of
1981 and the West German census of 1987, and the first census after reunification in
2011. Due to the long intercensal period, the German Federal Statistical Office
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Table 3 Demographic data sources
Country Years Notes
Austria 1990–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (RB)
Belgium 1990–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (RB)
Bulgaria 1990–2012 Censuses: 1992 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Czech
Republic
1992–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Denmark 1990–2012 For the Danish NUTS 2 regions newly formed in 2007, Eurostat provides
only population data dating back to 1990, and no birth data. The latter
have been derived based on municipality-level data from the StatBank
of Statistics Denmark
Censuses: Annual data derived from register
France 1990–2012 Censuses: 1990 (C), 1999 (C), 2004–2008 (RC), 2009–2014 (RC)
Finland 1990–2012 In the Eurostat data for the births in 1996 the age of the mother was
derived based on a different standard than for the rest of the series. This
was confirmed by a comparison of the data with data available in the
StatFin database of Statistics Finland. Thus, we replaced the 1996 birth
data with data directly obtained from the StatFin database
Censuses: Annual data derived from register
Germany
(West/East)
1991–2012 For the period 1991–1999, the data were obtained from individual-level
counts derived from the birth register (FDZ 2015). Birth register data
are missing for the regions of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern between 1991
and 1994 and Saarland in 1991. In these cases we obtained data from
published statistics in which the age of the mother had been derived by
subtracting the birth year of the mother from the birth year of the child
Economic data from Cambridge Econometrics for the regions Chemnitz
and Leipzig are based on an old regional classification where the district
of Do¨beln is included in Leipzig, not Chemnitz. As such we derived the
demographic data based on this old set-up. However, for the years 2011
and 2012 we only were able to obtain fertility data for the new set-up.
But this should not have an effect on our estimates as the regions
Chemnitz and Leipzig had in this period very similar fertility trends and
levels
Censuses: 1981 (East, C), 1987 (West, C), 2011 (RB)
Greece 1990–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Hungary 1990–2012 Censuses: 1990 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Italy 1990–2012 Emilia-Romagna and Marche exchanged seven municipalities in 2009
and as such Eurostat provides no time series before 2000. We were not
able to reconstruct the data for the 1990s based on the current regional
boundaries, but since the administrative reform affected only small
parts of the population (less than 0.5% of that of Emilia-Romagna and
1.2% of that of Marche), having a small change in the regional set-up of
these two regions between 1999 and 2000 should not significantly affect
any estimates. For the 1990s, we obtained the data for these two regions
from a database by ISTAT, which provides regional fertility rates by
single ages
For Lazio, the age-specific fertility rates derived from Eurostat for 1998
deviated strongly from the time trend and the initially published Italian
statistics. Data for Lazio for 1998 were replaced by data from ISTAT
Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (RB)
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Table 3 continued
Country Years Notes
The
Netherlands
1990–2012 For the period 1990–2000 Eurostat does not provide regional data for the
Netherlands. These data were derived directly from Statistics
Netherlands. For these data the age of the mother is derived differently
than in the Eurostat data-probably by subtracting the birth year of the
mother from the birth year of the child
Censuses: 1991 (RB), 2001 (RB), 2011 (RB)
Norway 1990–2012 1990 (C, in part RB), 2001 (C, in part RB), 2011 (RB)
Poland 1991–2012 Censuses: 1988 (C), 2002 (C), 2011 (C)
Portugal 1992–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Romania 1993–2012 For the births in 1998, 2000, and 2010 the age of the mother seems to
have been derived based on a different standard than for the rest of the
series. This was confirmed by a comparison with the time series data
available in the TEMPO Online database of Statistics Romania. Thus,
we replaced the birth data for these 3 years with the data directly
obtained from Statistics Romania. Eurostat only has regional data from
1997 onward, while the TEMPO Online database of Statistics Romania
contains a series from 1993 onward which we included in the analysis
Censuses: 1992 (C), 2002 (C), 2011 (C)
Slovak
Republic
1996–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
Spain 1990–2012 Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (RB)
Sweden 1990–2012 Censuses: Annual data derived from register, 1990 (C)
UK 1991–2012 Eurostat does not provide regional UK data prior to 2000. Data for the
1990s were derived from local population statistics obtained from the
UK data archive. Economic data from Cambridge Econometrics for the
regions Cheshire and Merseyside are based on an old regional
classification where the city of Halton is included in Cheshire, not
Merseyside. As such the demographic data are derived based on this
set-up
For Scotland there is a small break in the regional definition in 2000, and
it was not possible to reconstruct data for the previous period based on
the current regional division. The changes were a movement of the
islands of North Ayrshire from the region Islands and Highlands to
Southwest Scotland and a movement of Helensburgh and Lomond from
Southwest Scotland to the region Islands and Highlands. For the period
before 2000, both birth counts and population data reflect the old
regional division
Among the two NUTS 2 regions in Wales, up to 1994 the births for a
number of small hamlets and settlements are assigned to the wrong
NUTS 2 region, while the population at risk is assigned correctly. This
should just have minor effects as these hamlets are very small relative
to the total population of the two NUTS 2 regions of Wales
Censuses: 1991 (C), 2001 (C), 2011 (C)
C Census, RB register-based census, RC rolling census, in part register-based
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decided not to provide backward adjustments by age for the intercensal period. In
Germany, the regional adjustments implemented after the census suggest that both
in eastern and western Germany the population over-count was highest in high
developed areas, implying that for these areas the fertility rates are downward
biased. This would then make it more difficult to identify a convex relationship. But
the deviations at the end of the long intercensal period are generally small with a
mean of - 1.6% deviation among the main childbearing age groups between 20 and
45 with minimum values of - 5% and only very few positive values. This is in line
with outcomes of an intercensal adjustment of the population data for eastern and
western Germany implemented as part of the Human Fertility Database project.
Klu¨sener et al. (2018) concluded that German fertility trends were only marginally
affected (the highest deviation between the original and adjusted TFR was 0.03 in
eastern Germany if all years of the intercensal period are compared). If the deviation
pattern for Hungary is similar to the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic,
where higher over-counts of up to 5% were registered in the most developed areas,
the bias in Hungary would also rather work against identifying a convex
relationship. For Poland, the capital region was both the most developed area and
had the lowest over-count, so the bias might increase the likeliness to identify a
convex relationship. However, only one region (Opole) exhibited a strong
population over-count, while the others deviated only by a maximum of three per
cent points from the deviation registered in Warsaw.
More serious data quality issues are evident in the Romanian data, for which we
have only backward-adjusted numbers for the national level available for the
intercensal period between 2002 and 2011. The Romanian regional data show at the
end of the intercensal period deviations of up to 20% among females aged
20–34 years. The breaks in the regional Romanian population time trends due to the
corrections implemented after the 2011 census suggest that population numbers
were too high in low developed outmigration areas and too low in the high
developed capital area. This fits with the regional pattern in neighbouring Bulgaria,
where we are able to contrast the originally published with the backward-corrected
population estimates. Romania is the only obvious example where we witness a
strong bias in our data towards the likeliness of identifying a convex relationship.
However, even in countries whose data have been backward-adjusted, there may be
inconsistencies and potential data quality issues. This was the case for the 2011
census in Poland, for instance (Tymicki and Zeman 2017). As such, the Eastern
European findings, as well as those for Southern Europe after the onset of the 2007
crisis, should be interpreted with some caution.
The TFR is calculated by aggregating the female age-specific fertility rates
(births per 1000 women of a specific age) across the six five-year age groups
between the fertile ages of 15 and 44. It can be interpreted as the average number of
children a woman would have if the age-specific fertility rates of a given year would
stay constant over the whole reproductive life-span of that woman. To create a
tempo-adjusted TFR, the approach outlined in Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012)
represents arguably the most sophisticated approach suggested in the literature, but
requires parity-specific fertility by age for the different regions. As these data are
not available, we use a second-best method of weighting by the average age at
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childbearing. This method has been described and evaluated by Potancˇokova´ et al.
(2008). Specifically, we estimate the tempo-adjusted TFR as suggested by
Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), by calculating dTFR = TFR/(1-DMACB), where
DMACB is the annual change in the mean age at childbearing.
Economic data were collected by Cambridge Econometrics (CE) primarily from
Eurostat, and then adjusted to 2005 Euros using purchasing power parity deflators.
A discussion why we decided to use employee compensation per capita is presented
in the main text. For documentation of the economic data from CE, we refer
interested readers to their data write-up available online (Cambridge Econometrics
2015).
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the set of European countries used in our
analysis. Column (1) of Table 4 shows the total number of sub-national NUTS 2
regions by country, and the total number of regions included in our models. Column
(2) provides information on the periods for which fertility data for the given year
and economic data for the preceding year are available. Columns (3), (4), (5), and
(6) of Table 4 list the average per capita GDP, the average employee compensation
per capita, the average TFR, and the average tempo-adjusted TFR. We emphasise
that these averages are not the averages of the different countries, but the averages
across all their regions over the whole time period. Per capita GDP is defined as
Total Gross Value Added, plus taxes, less subsidies on products, divided by the
region’s population. Employee compensation, which is our preferred measure of per
capita income as it accounts for household income levels better than GDP, is defined
as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee
in return for work done by the latter. It consists of wages and salaries, and of
employers’ social contributions. Both GDP and employee compensation are
adjusted to 2005 Euros. We present the GDP and employee compensation averages
side by side to show how the former compares to the latter. In general, GDP per
capita is about twice that of employee compensation, but the exact ratio varies
slightly across countries. Comparison of the average TFR and average tempo-
adjusted TFR gives a sense of which countries experienced significant degrees of
postponement. Postponement has been a factor across all of the different countries
in our sample, but its magnitude seems to vary across areas. In Belgium, for
instance, the two averages are not that far apart (1.71 to 1.85). On the other hand, the
average of the regional tempo-adjusted fertility rates in the Czech Republic is nearly
30% higher than the average of the regional period fertility rates indicating that
postponement has played a much more important role there.
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Table 4 Country list and summary statistics. Source: Eurostat, Statistical Offices, Cambridge Econo-
metrics; own calculations
Country NUTS 2
regions
all/used
Years Avg. GDP
per capita
(2005 €)
Avg. emp.
comp. per
capita (2005 €)
Avg. total
fertility rate
(TFR)
Avg.
tempo-
adjusted
TFR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 9/9 1990–2012 24,487 12,457 1.42 1.66
Belgium 11/11 1990–2012 23,564 10,627 1.71 1.85
Bulgaria 6/6 1991–2012 2622 1029 1.44 1.66
Czech
Republic
8/8 1992–2012 9079 3728 1.35 1.74
Denmark 5/5 1990–2012 31,206 16,733 1.81 2.02
Finland 5/4 1990–2012 22,001 11,086 1.86 1.99
France 22/22 1990–2012 21,398 12,806 1.81 1.97
Germany,
East
8/7 1992–2012 17,751 9791 1.19 1.50
Germany,
West
30/30 1991–2012 26,249 13,980 1.38 1.57
Greece 13/13 1990–2012 13,448 4178 1.39 1.67
Hungary 7/7 1991–2012 6676 3088 1.43 1.68
Italy 21/21 1990–2012 21,262 9000 1.29 1.44
The
Netherlands
12/12 1990–2012 25,764 12,763 1.71 1.79
Norway 7/7 1990–2012 40,193 18,588 1.87 2.07
Poland 16/16 1991–2012 5192 2012 1.47 1.62
Portugal 7/5 1992–2012 11,992 5641 1.43 1.65
Romania 8/8 1993–2012 3358 1327 1.33 1.51
Slovak
Republic
4/4 1996–2012 7431 2907 1.32 1.62
Spain 19/16 1990–2012 17,025 7398 1.25 1.46
Sweden 8/8 1990–2012 26,262 14,552 1.81 1.96
UK 37/37 1991–2012 23,414 12,567 1.77 1.95
Average values (Avg.) in the columns (3)–(6) of the table represent averages across all regions and all
years for the different countries presented. Emp. comp. is employee compensation, defined as the total
remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the
latter. It consists of wages and salaries, and of employers’ social contributions. GDP is the Gross
Domestic Product, defined as Total Gross Value Added plus taxes less subsidies on products. Both
employee compensation and GDP are adjusted to 2005 Euros. TFR is the period total fertility rate. The
tempo-adjusted TFR is equal to TFR/(1 - DMACB), where DMACB is the annual change in the mean
age at childbearing. German, Finnish, Portuguese, and Spanish regions are excluded because they are
non-mainland regions and/or are different culturally and politically. For Finland, these regions include the
A˚land islands; for Germany, Berlin; for Portugal, the Acores and Madeira, which constitute island regions
in the Atlantic; and for Spain, the North African exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Canary Islands in
the Atlantic
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